Urban violence has become a major threat in big cities of the world. Where the orthodox protection through the police and individual target hardening remain inefficient, the population must organize itself. This book contains first-hand accounts on a selection of the most innovative experiences in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Arab region and is of interest likewise for academics and urban practitioners, policy makers, international cooperation experts or travelers preparing a visit of one of the affected countries.

With a preface by Caroline Moser.

Kosta Mathéy (Prof. Dr.) is director of GLOBUS, the Global Urban Institute, in Berlin and teaches at the HafenCity University Hamburg. He conceived the »Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading Program« in Cape Town, generally considered to be the most successful of that kind in Africa. Silvia Matuk (Dipl.-Ing.) is co-director of GLOBUS and worked in housing reconstruction after the civil war in El Salvador.

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Introduction

Kosta Mathéy & Silvia Matuk

I.

In ancient times, cities were built to provide safety to citizens against personal robberies, warlords, and wild animals. Today, with the majority of world’s population living in an urban environment, the city does not provide that protection any more. Even if the city walls had not disappeared a long time ago, these walls would not provide more security, since crime and violence develop where the potential victims are to be found and in most big cities in the world their inhabitants live in constant fear of violence. We, as editors, have developed our interest, and concern in the topic primarily in working contexts in the countries of the Global South.

Silvia Matuk, while working in construction projects, with community, in highlands in Peru experienced the terror of the Sendero Luminoso and, like much of the dispersed population, had to withdraw to the capital only to see, how year after year, the threat of violence, was becoming an urban feature. In the 1990s, after the treaty to settle the civil war in El Salvador, she worked in housing construction for ex-guerilla members and displaced persons. Her conclusions from these experiences confirm the importance of housing for stabilization of peace processes, considered not only a basic need of the population but also an important element in the reconstruction of the social tissue, community cohesion and identification with a territory (Hays and Matuk, 1995:25-26).

Kosta Mathéy, with reference to his experience in urban upgrading for the poor in several countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America had been invited to develop solutions to urban insecurity while being in charge of designing the German cooperation project “Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading” (VPUU) in the township of Khayelitsha in South Africa.
This township, faced with an average of one murder per day, was considered to be one of the most violent places in the whole of Africa (Mathéy, 2006). Now, ten years later, this project has been executed and became known to be one of the most successful anti-violence programs on the continent.

In all those places visited it is the poor population who suffers most from the threat of violence and wherever we met a new community to work with, the proximity of a police station was among the top “needs” listed by the residents. This was somehow paradoxical, as only a short time later they would express that the police were least likely to help them in case they got attacked (and in certain cases, the police themselves were actually the biggest threat of all)¹.

The wealthy sections of the population, usually seek to protect themselves individually by turning their villas into sorts of castles with high walls and electric and barbed wire around them, hiring armed private guards, or moving into a gated community. This may be, to a certain extent, efficient in defending public violence, but not necessarily the more subtle domestic violence between family members, or more evident, violence against the employees.

The mentioned scenario includes, as one among several protective elements, the institutional security providers: the state and the private sector – which, quite frequently, cooperate by passing on information, funds, and even staff between each other. The private sector in particular, is rather a palliative approach to security provision and certainly not interested in effective prevention of violence, as this would remove the justification for their business to exist - a systemic problematic.

In cases where the state is not providing a service to the (poor section of the) population and where the private sector can not realize it’s expected gains because of the economic situation of the client, the population generally resorts to self-help practices. This kind of solution is well known in other urban sectors like the provision of infrastructure or even in education and health, but also in the field of security – like for example in the form of community watches or, in the worst case, in vigilantism and mob justice.

In our rapidly globalizing world, cities are growing bigger and bigger – which makes them more difficult to manage, while the governments, at local as well as central level, are losing resources. This makes the state more receptive to considering joining forces even with the poor sectors of population and assigning duties and rights that formerly were the exclusive responsibility of the state, down to the community. This kind of cooperation is commonly known as participatory governance. Concrete examples include, among other activities, neighbours going on joint patrols with a police officer or the police taking part in educational prevention exercises with youth. Recent publications and events also seem to confirm a tendency worldwide to seek closer contact between civil society and the state in an effort to reduce urban violence.
II.

Those experiences, where the local community with or without state assistance, is joining to improve safety in their neighbourhood through violence prevention initiatives, represent a joint interest between the essays contained in this anthology. Many of the authors represented met for the first time 2014 at an international conference on Community-Based Urban Violence Prevention in Berlin,\(^2\) where they discovered and discussed their common knowledge and interests in the field.

One major observation at this meeting was the large variety of community led responses, presented in the different countries and communities, which, first of all, responded to a variety of different manifestations of violence, but simultaneously depended on the social formation that regulates the division of power between state, market, and citizens in each case. Other important variables to explain the differences include the cultural background and external factors, like the world market for drugs.

A first approach, and closest to the Khayelitsha experience mentioned above, was sought in the U-CARE research project\(^3\) which responded to a call by the Volkswagen Foundation and referred to the Sub Sahara Africa region. The results of this cooperative project with three African Universities in Johannesburg,\(^4\) Nairobi\(^5\) and Douala\(^6\) are exposed in the first three case studies in this volume. One of the very first insights obtained in this comparative work was the need to agree on very precise definitions of various forms of violence encountered. It is not an exaggeration to claim that more than 80% of the public, and also academic, discourse does not differentiate between crime and violence, and even less bother to disclose whether their argumentations refer to ordinary robbery, trafficking related violence, school violence, gang rape, domestic violence, racist or fanatic religious attacks, paramilitary interventions, state violence, or any other violent manifestation, which all have different roots and cannot be cured by one single remedy.
Keeping this observation in mind, Nicholas Kasang – member of the U-CARE team, begins his theoretical reflections with a useful systematization of urban violence. After that he refers to different schools of thought about the origins of violence and adequate strategies to increase urban safety. A large section of such theories, especially those relating to violence hot spots and others well known to urban planners, are “place based” and suggest improvements to the built environment in order to reduce violence. If such strategies work at all (there is not much evidence on that), the effect is most likely a displacement of the perpetrators activity to other places but not necessarily an overall reduction in volume. Hence, more recent thoughts on prevention policies rely on social and institutional aspects until they eventually join the participatory governance stream mentioned before.

The case study on Yeoville neighbourhood in Johannesburg, South Africa, conducted by Obvious Katsaura, describes a process of de-gentrification with an almost complete substitution of the former white population by a black one, including an important inner African migrant population. During the period of research, xenophobic violence exploded in Johannesburg and resulted in numerous attacks on these migrants, several of which were fatal. Different community organizations dealing with local security threats have been analyzed by Katsaura. Most of them seemed to maintain a rather conservative view on migration and tend to reproduce the xenophobic biases of the population, thus increasing the fear perceived by the foreign residents.

In his research on Dandora, an old World Bank Sites-and-Services project in Nairobi, Kenya, Romanus Opiyo links incidences of violence with different types of land uses and their change over time. Due to disinvestment in public infrastructure and rising crime levels, the original cohesive community has largely moved away and gave place to a relatively fluctuant population mixed with commercial use of plots and

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Right: Neighbourhood watch in Toronto. Source: Wikimedia/ Patentattorney88
premises, giving way to what is often referred to as an “unstable neigdhboorhood”. The loss in social cohesion in turn sped up manifestations of urban violence (mostly in form of robbery) to which the population, in addition to community policing (a common habit in most low-income Nairobi neighbourhoods) reverted to individual prevention strategies: the poorer section – in line with situational and rational choice theories – avoided exposure to risk by barring doors and windows, staying indoors at dark, or seeking trusted company when going out while the richer residents and businessmen hired watchmen. Only 30% would report an attack to the police, although there was a belief that the secret Kwekwe police squads, which had been installed to counter the dreaded Mungiki gangs and are known for performing extra legal killings, contributed to the slight decline in official violence statistics.

In contrast to the Dandora case, the third case study within the U-CARE project, conducted by Christophe Sados, concentrates on collective community responses to violence in Cameroon. The principal threats experienced were robberies and burglaries, many of which were combined with physical aggression. The standard prevention strategies were block- and community watches, supported by physical measures in the form of target hardening (locks, bars, enclosure walls) and other physical measures and situational precautions (street lighting, clearing vacant open spaces). As could be expected, in rich neighbourhoods the block watches – or even road blocks – are contracted out to commercial service providers and the physical protection measures are more sophisticated. Poor and middle income communities, usually headed by a neighbour- hood chief in line with village tradition, organize the watches and voluntary work through family members and absentee neighbours are encouraged to contribute with a financial compensation. Also these watches are progressively staffed with paid guards as time passes. The community watches are a more recent introduction and, in the view of the residents,
have been efficient in reducing the incidences of crime and violence – including violence by the community itself in the form of mob justice. Paradoxically this relief also reduces the willingness of the community members to contribute financially or in time to maintaining the community watches.

**Guinea Bissau** does not really have big cities: the capital has less than 500,000 inhabitants and the next biggest town only has 22,000. Nevertheless, violence levels are relatively high, on a similar rank as Kenya or Mexico on the Global Peace Index (Vision of Humanity, 2013). The state justice system has not developed very far, but there is a whole variety of habitual systems of conflict resolution – which are adequate in preventing conflict from turning into open violence. **Anne-Kristin Borszik** has investigated and compared practices of different alternative conflict mediators sought by the local people, such as the local police, religious leaders (in this case Imams), radio moderators (life broadcasting), or professional dispute settlers. Furthermore, there are also ways to involve non-impartial negotiators, like quarter heads, chiefs, influential relatives, the army - or to bribe the state institutions supposed to assume an neutral position (“pocket jurisdiction”). Finally, in certain cases, an individual involved in conflict may prefer to give in and keep quiet, considering the factual power constellations in town or the social cost of pushing for justice. The important message of the study could be that the western concept of relying on one single institution to decide on right or wrong may not necessarily be the most intelligent rule in society – especially if that institution is part of a corrupt state system.

While West African countries tend to be marked by weak states, **China** stands for the opposite. Civil crime may be comparatively under control in that country, but the power monopoly by the state at times creates another problem of violence. **Qin Shao** reports on the practice of “domicide” in Shanghai and other places, involving forceful evictions from residences in quarters earmarked for redevelopment – even in cases when the law and court rulings protect against such action. Local governments do not restrain from hiring demolition squads who beat up protesters or set remaining houses on fire. The threatened residents have developed different defensive strategies such as employing legal advice to detect loopholes in the applied legislation or its implementation; protecting their dwellings through decorating it with Chinese flags or singing the “Internationale”; publishing videos and blogs through the media and internet and likewise organizing manifestations in public spaces. So far, the success of those actions remains limited and, in most cases, can only delay but not stop the redevelopment projects for a number of years.

After extrapolating on the consequences of failing control and excesses of control by the state in the two previous chapters, **Heidrun Zinecker**, with reference to Charles Tittle (1997) and Peter Wallenstein (1999) presents the theory that both, excessive or defunct control by the state are decisive breeding grounds for a violent society. The importance of a similar equilibrium between too much and deficient involvement holds true as well for the civil society. She tests and endorses this theorem through a comparative study of five **Central American States**:
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The comparison also reveals the positive example of a society with currently a very low presence of urban violence, in spite of widespread poverty, represented by Nicaragua. An important factor for this result is the cooperation of a non-repressive police force cooperating closely with community representatives. The theory presented by Zinecker could be further refined and visualized by the following diagram:
While the Chapter by Heidrun Zinecker emphasizes the impact on state control, Luz Amparo Sánchez, in her study on District 13 in Medellin, Colombia, concentrates on civil society, which despite suffering multiple violent attacks by the army, paramilitaries, and guerrillas, managed to make the situation change. Because of its strategic (and essential for controlling for drug trafficking) localization on the main road between Medellin and the coast, this district experienced much more violence than other similar neighbourhoods in the city. Many of the residents have either been extinguished, displaced from their homes by the fighting, or have left voluntarily. Remaining neighbours had no chances to enter in an arrangement with the armed groups because they lived in between the front lines. Cooperating with one group would immediately mark them as enemies for the others. From a position of “nothing left to lose” they opted for an offensive “no violence” strategy, including white handkerchief marches, massive occupation of public spaces, and the like. This movement was started by the mothers, but soon the youth joined in by organizing events that expressed their interests more closely. The activities of adolescents were also able to call the attention of the city, if not the nation, to this neighbourhood. Examples of these activities include regular hip-hop festivals, art murals and graffiti, radio programs, flash-mob gatherings with percussion performances etc. A third type of peace activities were solidarity actions and associations of and with those who lost family members, their houses, their future, etc. The common unifying element was described as “togetherness” which gave force to the community members and confused the armed groups in this district.

The – literally constructive – “Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading” approach, referred to in the South African experience in Khayelitsha at the beginning of this introduction, also was an important aspect of a slum upgrading project in El Salvador, with funding from the same institution, and is being evaluated by Joanna Kotowski in one of the following chapters. Apart from physical upgrading of the urban infrastructure (which had been partially blamed for the increase in violence in Dandora in chapter 4), important social development components were also included in this program, executed by the renowned Non-Governmental Agency FUNDASAL. In line with general expert assumptions, everything was done right in this project and the evaluation confirmed that through the project general safety deficits have significantly improved for the residents – such as security of tenure, access to social and technical infrastructure, recreational facilities, and social assistance. However, the evaluation could surprisingly not identify clear evidence for a reduction of violence levels in the zone as a result of the project. The evaluation concludes: “In light of the extremely difficult and conflictive framework conditions, this aim might have been too ambitious. But the programme could have done more in this respect, if an explicit strategy for prevention of urban violence would have been designed from the very beginning.”

Similar to El Salvador, Mexico has likewise suffered from the proliferation of violence in Central America, with the decision by president Calderon to launch the “war on drugs” in 2007, greatly increasing drug related violence, especially in the western part of the country. The army
and specialized forces attempted to win control over the drug mafia who responded fiercely and also terrorized everyday life of the local population, previously not very much affected by gang violence. Veronica Martínez directed a research project on the impact of violence on victims and their families, which is the basis of her chapter. The affected and potential victims of violence are alienated by the government: generally crimes are not reported to the police, who have proved to be little help in the past, do not pass on the charges made by the population to the jurisdiction, and might even be directly linked to the criminal gangs. Neighbours only unite to defend themselves against petty crime with which, given the inefficiency of the police, they deal with in terms of vigilante justice. They do, however, recognize that organized crime is more powerful than they are themselves and hence try not to get involved at all in fighting the most serious violence. Sometimes weapons are kept at home for self defence. Since nobody knows for sure whether any of the neighbours, or their children, are connected to the gangs, the topic of violence is not discussed in detail, and not mentioned to foreigners at all. Social life came to a standstill as anyone tries not to leave the house at all, reason for fear is everywhere. Very few victims engage in collective actions like marches or the use of social media. Any public events addressing the violence are generally sustained by supporters living in other parts of the country on comparatively safe terrain.

The dominance of organized crime in the western part Mexico is an extreme problem, but organized crime, especially in the form of youth gangs, is a general phenomenon in the Americas. Joining a gang offers certain attraction to the youth in a poor neighbourhood: money, prestige, power, women, and a sense of belonging. Once having gone through the integration ritual, it is almost impossible for a gang member to return to normal life (and the tattoos with the gang’s symbols are meant to inhibit it many cases). Therefore, current prevention policies concentrate on reaching youth before they can join a gang, and trying to offer them a somewhat more sustainable plan for the future. Sports facilities are quite common elements of such prevention programs, intended to foster an alternative feeling of belonging in the youth, which they may seek in a gang otherwise. Equally important are training opportunities in a professional occupation that can generate income in the long run. This situation of the youth who can become potential gang members is well analyzed in the paper authored by María Antonieta Beltrán and Wim Savenije. They explain very clearly why, in a deprived neighbourhood, the gangs represent the final destination in an odyssey of lost or absent opportunities and that effective prevention must start in earlier in childhood and should be, above all, comprehensive by addressing all aspects of community life. A rather good example of such an approach is the city wide PROJovenes9 program in El Salvador which the authors describe in greater detail. Program elements include the management of public spaces, vocational training, community building, and institutional development. Although the program involves a large amount of voluntary labour, it requires external funding which can affect its sustainability.10
Sustainability is always a critical point in externally funded programs. The contribution on and by AEQUUS is remarkable because it presents a grass roots initiative started and maintained by a group of local youth after a friend of them was shot by a gang. They decided that they must do something to provide better alternatives for their fellow youth in their extremely violent neighbourhood and being university students themselves, they began to provide free pre-university classes and other courses to young people from the barrio (living quarter). By doing so they already facilitated access to university studies for 60 other young people from the neighbourhood and helped others to learn English or to start an artistic career. What is especially remarkable is the silent support received from many gang members who send their younger brothers to participate in the educational offers of AEQUUS since they wish that they do not to follow their own fatal destiny and join one of the gangs.

Palestinian refugee camps are a different urban situation where we find a concentration of young people growing up without realistic perspectives to find a rewarding occupation after leaving school. Fatima M. Al-Nammari reports from an integral youth oriented program in Talbiyeh, the location of the oldest refugee camp in Jordan. The initiative is remarkable since it is preventive in its truest sense, as it starts before conflicts can develop into vagrant violence, as can be seen in the daily news about countries including Iraq, Syria, or Yemen. The project is particularly interesting in relation to urban development, since it’s main component was an improvement-beautification element, which, as a topic of interest for all inhabitants, functioned as a common denominator and helped to bring together different sections of the camp society to work: young and old, women and men, professionals and the unemployed, all exchanging ideas about the same subject. Apart from the physical improvement results better social relations were confirmed by many sides and, in addition, numerous training activities provided better employment chances. Maybe the most important and long-lasting
positive result was the introduction and spreading of the concept of “safe zones” where anyone entering was assured to be exempted from any kind of (physical, verbal, or other) aggression.

In the case of the refugee camps, which usually are enclosed at least in the initial period when they were established, most conflicts (can only) arise within the same community while a merger with the guest country’s population is not envisaged. In other societies, where different cultures share the same space, conflict is generated more easily. As elaborated in the chapter written by Reza Masoudi Nejad, Mumbai is a case where India’s Hindus and Muslims, whom for most of India’s history peacefully lived side-by-side in the same neighbourhoods. However, clashes between these major fractions of Indian society exploded in 1992,11 when riots with more than 100 casualties broke out between the two religious communities. Typically, the religious differences were not the true cause of the riots, but were instrumental for political motives. After those tragic events, delegates from both sides came together to find ways to re-establish the peaceful coexistence of both religious communities and they eventually agreed to re-organize the tradition of religious processions, which had been maintained by both religions in the same district Dharavi (also referred to today as the world’s biggest slum area) and in the same period of the year for centuries. These processions were to use the same route connecting both Muslim mosques and Hindu temples, showing respect for each others’ beliefs. Animosities were overcome and since then no further frictions appeared between both communities in Dharavi. It seems that the act of a procession, known in many cultures and religions, causes a deeper impact in human psychology than generally realized and which is worth studying in greater detail. The processions’ peace building capacities have, consciously or not, been used in certain other manifestations around the world, like in the case of gay parades or by the Carnival of Cultures in Berlin. The latter brings together different immigrant communities in this city, neutralizes remaining xenophobia, and makes even the more conservative citizens proud of the city’s cosmopolitanism.

11. There had been earlier clashes in 1893 after which a peace agreement was reached and lasted for almost 100 years.
Back to South Africa, Obvious Katsaura in his second contribution to this volume, analyses the role of religion and spirituality for violence prevention in modern urban society. He argues, that

“given the institutional gap created by the inadequacies of the state, the governance of violence invites other social institutions and civic collectivities, which then fill this gap. In this case, religion is one of the social institutions that play an important role in the making of urban orders.”

First of all, traditional African belief in the power of spirits is sought to protect the individual against homicides, witnessed so frequently in the big cities today – especially by black migrants who arrive from rural areas or from abroad. Equally, traditional healers play a key role in guaranteeing spiritual protection from physical attacks by criminals. A Christian equivalent can be found in Pentecostal practices in Johannesburg which promise divine protection against attacks by carrying pictures of their prophet or other dedicated items with them, including prayers. Similarly, the supposedly rational adjustment of personal behaviour, like avoiding dangerous places when choosing a movement route in town or avoiding certain hours of the day, has a lot to do with belief that renders a feeling of security. There is a tendency to automatically associate belief and myths with poor and insufficiently educated social layers. But Katsaura reminds us that also high income neighbourhoods with all their public and private security industries and their “obsession with fear” use excessive security preventions that have become ritualistic and simultaneously create psychological comfort and disturbances.

Quite a different approach to violence prevention is suggested by Barbara and Emma Holtmann, equally with reference to South Africa. As illustrated by her two case studies in Khayelitsha Township, outside Cape Town, and Joubert Park in the centre of Johannesburg, the methodology of the “Social Transformation System”, developed by the two authors, allows individuals to approach the vicious cycle of crime and violence in an integrated manner and realize local resources. In the framework of community workshops, the participants usually develop a safety plan for the community and the present stakeholders can offer commitments for change. Although there is no evidence that this approach will work against intruders from outside the community, it is one of the very few strategies also to address domestic and sexual violence.

The 15 case studies presented can by no means cover the entire spectrum of possible manifestations of urban violence and even list all responses (and their combinations) tested in different settings. But they certainly illustrate the complexity of the problematic, the importance of the political and cultural context but also of external factors like the international drug mafia. The cases also endorse our starting assumption that there are better alternatives than primarily relying on police intervention or environmental-physical precautions. They represent, at best, a stone in the entire mosaic of violence-free urban and social development strategies. Nevertheless, we believe that a systematization of experiences can be helpful and have compiled a short table referring to the cases included in this anthology:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country &amp; Author</th>
<th>Reported form of violence</th>
<th>Prevention strategies sought</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 3. South Africa  
Obvious Katsaura | Ethnic & xenophobic | Integration in community policing and NGOs | Very limited effect as prejudices are reproduced inside the committees | Fear by the (migrant) target group persists |
| 4. Kenya  
Romanus Opioyo | Primarily robberies and burglaries, also some kidnapping and rape | Mostly individual: moving to a safer area, barring houses, avoiding being alone in the street at dark, some private guards | Slight reduction in reported violence | Disinvestment in public infrastructure contributes to loss of community cohesion and fluctuant population |
| 5. Cameroon  
Christophe Sados | Robberies, burglaries, physical assault | Community watches | Respondents perceive a decline in violence | Perceived decline in victimization reduces willingness to contribute personally |
| 6. Guinea Bissau  
Anne-Kristin Borszik | All sorts of conflicts between members of the community | Conflict settlement or negotiation through intermediaries such as the police, radio moderators, imams, negotiators, influential relatives, or the army | Resolution of conflict if both parties agree. Alternatively the offended may decide on giving in if downgrading social status would be cost for insisting on a settlement | Intelligent solution where the state fails to provide a fair conflict resolution mechanism |
| 7. China  
Qin Shao | Domicide - state violence manifest in home evictions | Legal opposition, public protest, manifestations, informing the media | Often delays of the eviction process can be achieved, but rarely long term results | Change of the state’s role as protector of civil rights into perpetrator |
| 8. Central America  
Heidrun Zinecker | Latent terrorism by state and gangs evolving from civil society | Control of violence through equilibrium between excessive an failing control through state and civil society | An example of a good equilibrium is Nicaragua with low levels of violence | Focus is put on state intervention and less on initiatives generated by civil society |
| 9. Colombia  
Luz Amparo Sánchez | Rampant violence caused by competing armed groups and the military. Illegal taxation of population by gangs. | Different manifestation of “non-violence” responses: marches, mass occupation of open spaces, cultural events, and festivals | Reduction but no complete elimination of violence. Legalization of residence for informal settlement could be won in parallel. | Even more important is the psychological support to the population and positive perspectives in the life for the youth as an alternative to gang membership. |
| 10. El Salvador  
Joanna Kotowski | Youth gangs, homicide, theft, robbery, threats, extortion, and other types of crimes. | Safe housing and infrastructure, social facilities, community development, recreational facilities for the youth | General safety parameters have significantly improved, but no direct impact on levels of violence could be identified | In spite of a strong participatory approach the project was initiated by a foreign financial cooperation agency and not really a “community initiative” |
| 11. Mexico  
Veronica Martínez | disappearances, executions, protection fees, shootings, forced sale of property | Vigilante justice against petty crime, possibly self defense at home with own arms; radically minimizing public and social life, | no results documented so far | The reason for the explosion and generalization of violence was the strong arm policies introduced by president Calderon in an opportunistic election campaign |
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>12. El Salvador</strong>&lt;br&gt;Maria Antonieta Beltrán and Wim Savenije</td>
<td>Organized crime recruiting youth from deprived neighbourhoods in San Salvador</td>
<td>Integration of public space management, vocational training, community development, institutional development, scholarships</td>
<td>By end of 2013, four thousand young people participated in the program, provision of 400 scholarships. Impact assessment is not (yet) available</td>
<td>EU-funding for PRO-JO VENES ended in Dec. 2013, but more generous funding has been announced for a follow-up program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>13. Colombia</strong>&lt;br&gt;Julieth Sánchez Betancourt and Carlos Restrepo</td>
<td>Competing youth gangs establishing “invisible” frontiers in the territory which to cross may end up in being shot without warning, exertion of illegal taxes by the gangs, recruiting of children</td>
<td>Provision of free education to compensate for failures by the state educational system and giving fellow youth income relevant education and identity through cultural events by the group.</td>
<td>60 youth from the neighbourhood sufficiently prepared to be accepted at the university entry exam, other educational programs. Proving an alternative for adolescents from joining a criminal gang.</td>
<td>Special mention because it is local and self generated initiative, funded by voluntary work and donations from the neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>14. Jordan</strong>&lt;br&gt;Fátima Al-Nammari</td>
<td>Petty theft, drug trafficking, vandalism, arson, child abuse, rape, physical and verbal assault, security clashes</td>
<td>Open space improvement, participatory design workshops, familiarization with the concept of “Safe Zones”, training in life skills.</td>
<td>Improvement of self-esteem, desire for volunteering, respect and tolerance of having different ideas</td>
<td>Project was stopped after funding period and the new generation regress to patterns of behavior that had been overcome through the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>15. India</strong>&lt;br&gt;Reza Masoudi Nejad</td>
<td>Religious clashes and bombings, in this particular case, between Hindus and Muslims</td>
<td>Processions uniting territories of conflicting parties</td>
<td>Construction of tolerance and acceptance and even pride about multiculturalism</td>
<td>Uniting power of processions can also be observed elsewhere, like in the Berlin Carnival of Cultures or gay parades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>16. South Africa</strong>&lt;br&gt;Obvious Katsaura</td>
<td>Street robberies, burglaries, car-jacking, homicide</td>
<td>Pleasing the bad spirits, prayers, talismans, support from traditional healers, avoiding places believed to be dangerous, reliance on technology and guards</td>
<td>Psychological tranquility to control (partly irrational) fear of violence</td>
<td>Research still in progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17. South Africa</strong>&lt;br&gt;Barbara and Emma Holtmann</td>
<td>Cycle of crime. homicide, robberies, gang violence, rape, domestic violence</td>
<td>Systemic transformation through collaborative actions, development and implementation of safety and action plans</td>
<td>Vision of what it looks like when it’s fixed. Results are very location specific and depend on the stakeholders participating in the process.</td>
<td>Violence may be reduced inside the community, including domestic violence, but protection against perpetrators from outside the community is limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Overview over strategies in urban violence prevention as presented in the chapters of this book
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Kosta Mathéy and Silvia Matuk

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